Autonomy, Education, and Societal Legitimacy Essay -- Educational Pape

Autonomy, Education, and Societal LegitimacyI argue that liberty should be see as an educational concept, dependent on many educative institutions, including notwithstanding not limited to controlment. This interpretation will improve the understanding of autonomy in relation to questions or so institutional and societal legitimate authority. I aim to make plausible three connected ideas. (1) Respecting single(a) autonomy, flop understood, is consistent with an interest in institutions in social and political philosophy. much(prenominal) interest, however, does require a broadening of questions active institutional and societal legitimacy. (2) soulfulness autonomy can and should be re-conceived as a multi-institutional educational notion. We moldiness appreciate the manifold institutional process. There are diverse questions about legitimacy as institutional and societal authority that generate prescriptive demands binding on the individual. (3) There is some uncertainty a bout which institutions do or should educate for autonomy. The shift to an educational, multi-institutional determine of autonomy renders more confutative and probably de-emphasizes the role of blame and punishment as paradigmatically institutionalized expressions of find for autonomy in educating for autonomy. Nonetheless, such an educational model does not decease concern about autonomy, blame and punishment. Rather, it broadens questions about the legitimacy of the normative scarper of various institutions, and of society as a whole. IThis paper is think to make it plausible to believe three connected propositions. The paper is about the variety of social institutions that educate persons (for good or ill) about normative issues. It is about some connections betw... ...cially p. 57.(12) Interestingly, Joel Feinberg is aware of the possible future decay of the nation-state, and he concedes that this power require some adjustments in our thinking about the analogy between a utonomous individuals and autonomous states. Feinberg, however, does not seem to favor or even entertain the idea that if there were fundamental institutional changes, we might do well to modify our reliance on analogies between individual persons and states so far as the theory of autonomy is concerned. See aggrieve to Self, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 50-51.Feinberg is here commenting on autonomy as the sovereign authority to govern oneself. His position seems puzzling for many reasons, especially in its unsupported financial statement that even if a sense of world community grows, we ought to continue to model individual autonomy on the nation-state.